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Abstract 
Fitness is a central concept in evolutionary theory. Just as it is central to biological 
evolution, so, it seems, it should be central to cultural evolutionary theory (CET). But 
importing the biological fitness concept to CET is no straightforward task—there are 
many features unique to cultural evolution that make this difficult. This has led some 
theorists to argue that there are fundamental problems with cultural fitness that render it 
hopelessly confused. In this essay, we defend the coherency of cultural fitness against 
those who call it into doubt.  
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1 Introduction 
 The 1970s witnessed a grand effort to ‘biologicize’ human behavior. In his ([1975]) 
magnum opus, Sociobiology, E. O. Wilson famously (or infamously) included a 27th 
chapter in which he applied the sociobiological framework he had developed for ants and 
other non-human animals to Homo sapiens. This quest to biologicize human behavior, to 
attempt to explain it using the same models used for other non-human animals, received 
intense and immediate censure. Many cultural anthropologist saw such models as not 
only too crude to capture the richness of human culture, but also empirically wrong (e.g., 
Sahlins [1976]; Barkow [1978]): We just don’t act to promote our biological fitness. 
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Instead there are many human acts that are biological dead ends—the practice of 
celibacy, for example. Although these behaviors seem to undermine the reproductive 
success of individuals, many individuals adopt these cultural practices.  
Although some of the critiques of human sociobiology were off target, it seems 
correct that a merely gene-focused view of human behavior will not suffice. One 
response to this apparent failure of an exclusively gene-focused view was to see humans 
as possessing two inheritance tracks, not merely one. One track is genetic, but the other is 
cultural. This ‘dual inheritance’ account was developed by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 
([1981]), Boyd and Richerson ([1985]), Durham ([1991]), and others. Their response 
constituted not a rejection of biological models, but their extension to the cultural realm. 
Along with this came questions about the degree to which such an extension requires 
revisions of the models and modifications of central concepts. Despite the substantial 
progress in cultural evolutionary theory, there remains much debate and 
misunderstanding about some of the core concepts at the foundation of this theory. 
The focus of this essay will be on one of these core concepts, that of cultural 
fitness. The driving question is whether the concept (or family of concepts) of fitness, 
developed within the context of biological evolution, can be applied to cultural evolution 
and, if so, how it should be understood within this new context.  In accounts of cultural 
evolution, cultural fitness is a concept that seems to do considerable work. Many theorists 
have stressed that the explanatory power of cultural evolution theories (CETs) depends on 
a well-defined concept of cultural fitness. For example, according to David Sloan Wilson 
([1999], p. 206) ‘[t]he ability to define fitness independently of what evolves saves the 
concept of natural selection from being a tautology. For the meme concept to escape the 
same problem, we must define cultural fitness independently of what evolves. If the first 
four notes of Beethoven’s fifth is a powerful meme only because it is common, we have 
achieved no insight.’ And Sterelny and Griffiths ([1999], p. 334) subscribe to Sober’s 
([1992]) critique of cultural evolution theories that ‘we have no explanation of the nature 
of the fitness of ideas, nor do we typically understand why they differ in fitness.’ To be 
clear, we will not argue that cultural evolution theories have explanatory power. We will 
only show that if cultural evolution theories have any explanatory power, this explanatory 
power depends – at least to some extent – on a sound concept of cultural fitness.   
Calls for a definition of ‘cultural fitness’ have resulted in numerous proposals. 
Cultural fitness has been defined as the relative success of cultural parents in transmitting 
a given cultural behavior pattern (Avital, Jablonka and Lachman [1998]), the ability of a 
cultural variant to be copied, stored and reproduced more frequently than other cultural 
variants (Blackmore [2010]), the replicant’s capacity for replication (Cavalli-Sforza and 
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Feldman [1981]), and the susceptibility to imitation (Jan [2000]), to give just a few 
examples. Unfortunately, many of these proposed definitions are not very precise, and it 
is no surprise that this has led to considerable confusion over cultural fitness. Henrich, 
Boyd, and Richerson ([2008]) list conceptual problems with cultural fitness as the source 
of one of the five most fundamental and recurrent misunderstandings about cultural 
evolution. 
 Part of the problem with developing a concept of cultural fitness is that there is 
considerable conceptual confusion and debate surrounding biological fitness (Ariew and 
Lewontin [2004]). There is uncertainty about how fitness should best be modeled and 
measured, and there are debates concerning whether it is token organismic fitness or trait 
fitness that is fundamental to evolutionary theory (Sober [2013]). Reviewing the debates 
concerning precisely how to define or model fitness would take us too far afield (see 
Ramsey and Pence [2013] for a review of some of these issues).  Instead, what is 
important to note is that one has to be very cautious when borrowing a concept of fitness 
from biology to serve as a foundation for cultural fitness. In addition to the challenges 
concerning borrowing concepts from biology—or developing concepts in parallel 
inspired from biological theory—there are several problems unique to cultural fitness. It 
has been argued, for instance, that the problems with cultural fitness are so grave that 
there is little value to trying to create a general theory of cultural evolution (Gabora 
[2011]; Strimling, Enquist and Erikson [2009]). In this paper, we will address the 
question of whether the pursuit of a coherent, useful concept of cultural fitness is indeed 
hopeless. We will use a two-step strategy to challenge key arguments against cultural 
fitness. First, we will show that the arguments do not actually undercut the use of cultural 
fitness in CETs. Second, to the degree that this first strategy fails or is insufficient, we 
will show that very similar problems arise for biological fitness. The second step intends 
to show that even if the problems are real and difficult to solve, they are not so serious as 
to warrant the automatic dismissal of evolutionary approaches to cultural explananda 
since the same reasons would undercut the use of fitness in the biological realm.  
 The arguments that our two-step strategy is supposed to tackle are the following: 
(1) cultural fitness is ill-defined because cultural generations are ill-defined (section 3.1), 
(2) it is not clear what the bearers of cultural fitness are (section 3.2), (3) there is no 
single scalar value for cultural fitness (section 4.1), and (4) cultural fitness values are 
intransitive (section 4.2). Although these critiques are not an exhaustive list, we feel that 
they constitute the most difficult challenges to the tenability of cultural fitness.  
 Once we have defended cultural fitness from these critiques, we turn to the 
question of what a positive account of cultural fitness might look like (section 5). Before 
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we can mount our defense of cultural fitness, however, we first have to explain why one 
cannot solve the problems we raise by just eliminating cultural fitness from CET.  
2 Cultural fitness is not superfluous 
Before we offer a defense of cultural fitness, we should first consider whether cultural 
fitness is an important—or even necessary—component of CET, since no defense is 
needed if cultural fitness is superfluous. Certainly, not everyone is convinced that cultural 
fitness is an important component of CET.  
Lewens ([2012]), for example, argues that eschewing cultural fitness may be the 
best way to proceed concerning the problems that have been raised with regard to cultural 
fitness. This solution is not entirely new. In the 1989 Nancy L. Schwartz Lecture, 
Reinhart Selten sketched a fictitious dialogue between a population geneticist and an 
adaptationist about the promises and perils of CET. Both the population geneticist and the 
adaptationist claim that cultural fitness is not a concept they need for studying cultural 
evolution. According to Selten’s adaptationist, ‘cultural evolution tends to the 
maximization of biological fitness.  We do not need a concept of cultural fitness’ (Selten 
[1991], p. 12). Selten’s population geneticist disagrees with the reason for rejecting 
cultural fitness, but he agrees that ‘it is unclear whether a cultural fitness concept could 
be useful’ (Selten [1991], 12). The population geneticist then goes on to argue that the 
models of cultural evolution are mostly models of quantitative inheritance and that the 
fitness concept is not useful for quantitative inheritance. Much like Lewens, Selten’s 
population geneticist believes that mathematical and statistical tools suffice to explain 
population-level phenomena as the aggregated effects of interacting individuals.  
 Suggestions to do without fitness have been voiced in biology as well. Dawkins, 
for instance, devoted a whole chapter in The Extended Phenotype to argue for the view 
that ‘fitness is a very difficult concept, and that there might be something to be said to do 
without it whenever we can’ (Dawkins [1982], p. 179). According to Dawkins, natural 
selection is too valuable a theory to let it be compromised by what he clearly sees as 
philosophical quibbles over an unnecessary concept. Perhaps much to Dawkins’ surprise, 
some philosophers seem to share his view that theories of evolution do not need a fitness 
concept. Millstein, for instance, has claimed that one can avoid disputes over fitness in 
evolutionary biology because it is possible to define evolution by natural selection in 
general terms without invoking fitness: Selection is a ‘discriminate sampling process 
whereby physical differences between organisms are causally relevant to differences in 
reproductive success’ (Millstein [2006], p. 640). Indeed, by substituting ‘causally relevant 
physical differences’ in place of ‘fitness differences’, she has successfully avoided the use 
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of the term ‘fitness’. Although there is in principle nothing wrong with this definition of 
selection, it seems to show only that one can avoid the term ‘fitness’, but it does not show 
that one can avoid the concept in reasoning about selection. After all, the phenotypic 
differences between organisms that are causally relevant to differences in reproductive 
success are—or at least give rise to—fitness differences. Moreover, the measurement of 
the expected influence of an individual on the presence of the trait in the next generation 
requires a measure of the relevance of the physical differences for reproductive success. 
And this measure is the good that fitness models can and should deliver. The conceptual 
link between selection and fitness has not gone unnoticed by biologists. In fact, it is not 
uncommon to define selection in terms of fitness differences. Lewontin’s ([1970]) lists 
fitness differences as one of the necessary requirements for evolution by natural selection 
and some standard evolutionary textbooks define selection as occurring via consistent 
differences in fitness (e.g., Futuyma [1998]).  
A similar counterargument can be developed against proposals to do away with 
‘cultural fitness’. Of course, one can argue that cultural evolution models can do without 
‘fitness’ because they try to capture the tendency of a cultural variant to spread through 
the population due to its effects on the behavior of its adopters. But this tendency is 
exactly what some theorists have called ‘cultural fitness’, so this counterargument would 
only have shown that we could do without the term ‘cultural fitness’, which is not an 
important theoretical achievement. It does nothing to show that the concept of fitness is 
superfluous. On the contrary, selection cannot do the theoretical work it is supposed to do 
without any fitness concept. This is as true for biological evolution, as it is for cultural 
evolution. Both in evolutionary biology and in CET, selection and fitness are 
conceptually linked, and one can avoid the term fitness, but not the concept (see also 
Pence and Ramsey [2013]), at least if one holds that selection has an important 
explanatory value for CETs.  
 Lewens’ eliminativist attitude towards cultural fitness stems from his view that 
CETs can do without selection. More specifically, Lewens has argued that a form of 
population thinking is the core of dual inheritance theory, and that this form of population 
thinking does not need natural selection: ‘Natural selection although present in some of 
Boyd and Richerson’s models, is not their explanatory centerpiece; population thinking 
is’ (Lewens [2010], p. 833). Although it is true that if CET does not need selection, it is 
not apt to need fitness either, we agree with Houkes ([2012]) that the explanatory value of 
dual inheritance theory depends largely on its selectionist character: Natural and cultural 
selection of cultural items occupy a central place in many of the explanations that CETs 
have to offer. A non-selectionist CET would not only do away with fitness, it would also 
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do away with much of the explanatory power of CETs. This is not to say that the only 
explanations and predictions of CET derive from cultural fitness. On the contrary, there 
are important results that derive from population thinking and the application of statistical 
models to cultural trait dynamics. Nevertheless, we hold that cultural fitness and the 
process of natural selection due to fitness differences is central to CET. Not only do 
Boyd, Richerson and their colleagues argue extensively for the natural selection of social 
transmission biases (Boyd and Richerson [1985]; Henrich and Boyd [1998]), the biased 
transmission of cultural variants itself can be understood as cultural selection (Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman [1981]), as we will explain in section 5. Just like perceptual biases 
are often considered to be components of selection in sexual selection (Ryan [1990]), we 
suggest that the transmission biases should be a part of selection/fitness in cultural 
evolution. 
Contra Lewens and others, we think that CET requires a respectable concept of 
cultural fitness in order to be a viable theory of cultural change. But even if our view is 
incorrect and a viable CET does not completely depend on a respectable notion of 
cultural fitness, few would disagree that it would be a good thing to have such a notion. 
The following sections try to demonstrate that it is possible to develop such a respectable 
notion because the putative fatal problems of cultural fitness are not in fact fatal. 
3 The individuation problem 
Cultural transmission differs in many respects from genetic transmission. For example, 
one’s cultural parents are not always one’s biological parents. One can socially learn from 
teachers with whom one is biologically only very distantly related. Older people can learn 
from their children, and a lot of cultural information is transmitted between peers. Genes, 
however, are almost always transmitted from parents to their biological offspring only.  1
This difference is emphasized in all introductory texts about cultural evolution (e.g. 
Richerson and Boyd [2005]; Mesoudi [2011]). In these introductions, cultural 
transmission is usually understood as transmission between distinct biological organisms, 
as if cultural individuals are biological organisms. But is this true? There seem to be 
cases that cast doubt on this assumption (Jablonka [1994]). For example, it appears 
 We are taking animals as our prototypical organism. This, of course, is to ignore prokaryotic 1
life, in which sex (exchange of genes) is not necessarily linked with reproduction. We will merely 
note here that we will not focus on prokaryotic life and that there are more parallels with 
prokaryotic genetic dynamics and cultural dynamics than there are with eukaryotic genetic 
dynamics (Jablonka and Lamb [2005]). But to expand on these parallels and contrasts is well 
beyond the scope of this paper.
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possible that one (biological) individual can be its own cultural parent: People can, for 
example, learn things from their diary that they had forgotten about. Furthermore, cultural 
parents can still transmit information to their cultural offspring even after their death as a 
biological organism. And if you read co-authored papers like this one, you seem to have 
one teacher consisting of two biological organisms. These cases illustrate that it might be 
difficult to get a clear understanding of what, precisely, cultural individuals are, and 
without a clear conception of cultural individuals, it is difficult to know how one can 
clearly conceive of cultural fitness. This individuation problem can be broken down into 
two distinct questions. First, what counts as a cultural generation? Second, what 
distinguishes growth from reproduction? We will consider these questions in turn.  
3.1 The generations-problem 
Some have argued that cultural fitness is ill defined because generations are not well 
defined (Gabora [2011]). If fitness requires the existence of generations, then the absence 
of clear-cut generations in culture entails that the cultural fitness of a variant cannot be 
determined at all. As Gabora argues,   
In biological terms, the fitness of an organism is the number of offspring it has in 
the next generation. The term ‘generation’ is applicable when individuals are 
irretrievably lost from a population and replaced by new ones. But with respect to 
culture, an outdated (or seemingly ‘dead’) idea or artifact can come back into use 
(or seemingly ‘come back to life’) when styles change or circumstances become 
right. Because there is no hard and fast distinction between a living entity and a 
dead one, there is no basis for determining what constitutes a generation. Thus the 
term generation does not apply to culture. ([2011], p. 74) 
Although we think that Gabora’s argument is not very conclusive, we readily admit that 
there is a problem with defining generations in cultural evolution. But even if this 
problem is intractable, or even if we had to conclude that there is no such thing as a 
cultural generation, we could still hold on to the view that cultural fitness is not doomed. 
This is true because fitness—biological or cultural—can be a useful concept with or 
without generations.  
It is true that the biological fitness of an individual organism is sometimes defined 
as the individual’s relative contribution to the gene pool of future generations of a 
population (Fisher [1999]; Haldane [1924]). Understandably, some cultural evolutionists 
have used this definition as a template for the definition of cultural fitness, which they 
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then see as the extent to which an individual can affect the proportional representation of 
a cultural trait in the next generation (Wenseleers et al. [2009]). Other cultural 
evolutionists, by contrast, avoid any reference to generations when they define cultural 
fitness, perhaps because they are aware of the difficulties with cultural generations. For 
instance, Henrich ([2004], p. 21) thinks that cultural fitness ‘measures the degree to 
which a particular value of φ, representing stuff stored in the head of individual i in group 
j at time t, affects its proportional representation in the population at time t + 1.’ Here, 
time-indexing replaces generation-indexing. This is far from a novelty coming from CET 
proponents. In biology, fitness is often time-indexed: Genetic fitness has been 
characterized as a ‘measure of the rate at which allele or linkage-group frequencies 
change within a gene pool through time’ (Wittenberger [1981], p. 614). Time indexing 
can be advantageous for biological fitness and the use of non-generational fitness 
measures has been defended over and over again (Metz et al. [1992]; Coulson et al. 
[2006]). 
Time indexing and generation indexing, we should emphasize, are not mere 
differences in model choice that produce no substantive difference. For instance, when 
generation time substantially varies between individuals of a particular population or 
when the species under consideration is iteroparous (reproducing multiple times), 
generation measures become much less useful than time measures (Grafen [1988]). 
Organisms that reproduce earlier in their life histories will tend to be fitter than others in 
their population, ceteris paribus. Since time indexing works in such biological cases (and 
frequently works much better than generation indexing), then it should work for culture 
in the absence of (well-defined) cultural generations. We therefore hold that the 
generation problem for CET is solved by time indexing. 
3.2 Cultural growth vs. cultural reproduction 
The use of time instead of generations solves one important problem, but there still must 
be a criterion for counting instances of cultural variants or cultural individuals. What 
should we count when we measure fitness? Echoing biological fitness definitions, 
cultural evolutionists give both organism-based (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman [1981]; 
Wenseleers et al. [2009]) and variant-based (Blackmore [1999]; Henrich [2004]) 
definitions of cultural fitness. Organism-based cultural fitness is often defined as the 
probability that the individual organism will be a model for—or be imitated by—others. 
Cultural variant-based views, on the other hand, focus on the cultural variants (cultural 
replicators or ‘memes’) and base their fitness on their probability of surviving and 
reproducing.  
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To distinguish these two approaches, consider for a moment how we could 
measure the cultural fitness of this essay. Do we count instances of the paper (number of 
times it has been downloaded or printed, say)? Or do we count the number of people who 
have read it, or who have cited it? If a person prints multiple copies, one to have at home 
and another to keep at their office, does this count as an increase in fitness (variant-based 
approach) or not (organism-based approach)? 
This difficulty touches on a problem that seems particularly pressing for cultural 
evolution, namely the problem of distinguishing growth from reproduction. In biology it 
is clear that counting the number of white/purple flowers of the common foxglove 
(Digitalis purpurea) is not how one should measure the fitness of the white/purple flower 
variants, whereas it is apt to count the plants with white/purple flowers (Janzen [1977]). 
This is not to say that flower number is irrelevant to fitness—it could even serve as a 
crude proxy, especially if flower number per plant is relatively constant—only that it is 
but one component of fitness. What really matters for evolution is the change over time in 
the frequency of plants with white/purple flowers. 
Let’s consider how this can help us distinguish cultural growth from cultural 
reproduction. Suppose that one individual designs a new T-shirt. The idea is in her head, 
but she also has a few drawings of the new T-shirt in her designer portfolio. Because she 
was afraid she would lose these drawings, she also scanned them and saved a copy of this 
scan on her laptop and on a flash drive. Because the T-shirt was thought to become an 
instant success, it was produced in high numbers. Despite this optimism, only 5 percent 
of the production was sold. However, the T-shirt subsequently became popular in the 
cultural niche of Belgian arthouse film lovers, all of whom bought twenty T-shirts 
because a popular Belgian arthouse director wears them during all his interviews. So 
what should we count when we want to know the cultural fitness of the T-shirt design? 
The drawings? All the produced T-shirts or only the ones that were sold? Or only the 
individuals who bought a T-shirt?  
From a memes’ eye view, meme replication is foundational and cultural fitness is 
based on the change in meme frequency between t and t+1. Whether or how humans are 
affected by the meme replication is irrelevant—what matters is that there are more (or 
fewer) T-shirt memes in existence. From the meme’s point of view, humans (or other 
cultural organisms) are just channels that are used for the meme’s replication: ‘a scholar 
is just a library’s way of making another library’ (Dennett [1995], p. 346). Blackmore 
([2010]) defines the cultural fitness of a melody along similar lines when she asks ‘what 
is fitness for a short melody? It is the ability to survive and reproduce, which in terms of 
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music means being copied, stored and reproduced more frequently than other 
melodies’ (p. 260). 
We believe, however, that this purely replicator-based account of cultural fitness 
runs into problems because it renders cultural fitness futile for a scientific theory of 
cultural evolution, and because it doesn’t distinguish cultural growth from cultural 
reproduction. Both problems are intimately intertwined: Only a fitness measure that 
distinguishes cultural reproduction from growth can be relevant for those sciences that 
deal with cultural evolution. Blackmore’s melody example would imply that the fitness of 
a particular melody would increase by it being copied or stored more than other melodies, 
even though it is only one person who makes all the copies of this melody (on media such 
as CDs, hard drives, memory sticks, or tapes). But counting these copies to measure 
fitness looks a lot like counting the number of white or purple foxglove flowers to 
measure the biological fitness of the white variant. Moreover, the serial copying of a 
particular melody by one individual may have no substantial effects in the social world. 
Likewise, xeroxing a drawing of a T-shirt a hundred times every day for a year would 
dramatically increase the fitness of the T-shirt meme, at least according to Blackmore and 
Dennett, even if it would not alter anything that biologists or social scientists are 
interested in.   
We take these problems with the memetic approach seriously and propose that 
one instead takes an alternative approach that preserves a cultural growth-reproduction 
distinction. Our alternative is to count just one variant per biological organism. That is, 
the currency of cultural fitness is individual organism’s adoption of cultural variants. This 
does not mean that the number of copies of the T-shirts, or number of images of the shirt 
posted on Facebook, are irrelevant—more T-shirts or T-shirt images can increase the 
probability of their adoption—it is that these copies are not what is to be counted in 
fitness determinations. The focus is on the number of organisms adopting the variants, 
not the number of variants. Put another way, while meme copy can serve as evidence for 
cultural fitness, it is not definitive of cultural fitness. 
 The theoretical advantages of adopting our proposal are several. First, focusing 
on biological rather than cultural individuals has the benefit of clarity and simplicity: We 
do not have to split biological individuals up into different cultural individuals, nor do we 
have to lump different biological individuals together into one cultural individual. While 
it is true that biological individuality is not free of problems (Janzen [1977]; Bouchard 
and Huneman [2013]), the problems of attempting to define cultural individuality 
independently of biological individuality are many times worse. Second, when population 
geneticists measure gene frequencies in a population, they are not counting the number of 
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copies of genes within each organism (in which case getting fatter would make you 
fitter). They instead count each organism only once—and the reasons for this are not 
merely epistemic. 
The individual that CETs are referring to when they offer individual-based 
definitions of cultural fitness tends to be the biological individual qua cultural individual 
(or qua cultural model), not some sort of de-biologized cultural individual (for an 
interesting exception, see Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman [1981]). Most importantly, the 
choice to count only one variant per biological individual allows for a more subtle and 
sophisticated CET.  According to CETs, culture matters because it has an influence on 2
behavior (phenotype). Following Galef ([1988]), Richerson and Boyd ([1997]) 
distinguish communication from culture, and they define communication as ephemeral 
information that has no long-term impact on the phenotype. Culture, on the other hand, is 
the kind of information that has lasting impact on the phenotype. It is for this reason that 
Ramsey ([2013]) takes having a lasting impact on the behavior of individuals as a 
necessary condition for information being cultural.  Consequently, counting the number 
of T-shirts (or the photocopies of a drawing) to measure the cultural fitness of the T-shirt 
(or drawing) would be like counting the sperm cells or eggs of a mammal to measure its 
biological fitness. Just like ejaculating is not the same as reproducing in biology, the 
intracranial or intrapersonal proliferation of cultural variants—including artifacts like 
books, drawings, or tools—is also not the foundation for cultural fitness. Some cultural 
artifacts—a statue, say—may have a cultural influence over many people over a long 
span of time. This does not mean that we need to tie cultural fitness to the influence of 
such artifacts. Instead, cultural fitness can (and should) be measured in terms of 
individuals adopting variants. Furthermore, as Ramsey ([2013]) notes, cultural artifacts 
can influence behavior without any cultural reproduction taking place. We must thus be 
careful when theorizing the role of artifacts to carefully distinguish genuine cases of 
cultural transmission from cases of the artifacts merely influencing behavior. 
That said, we do recognize that there may be explanatory projects where it would 
be useful to track the number of copies of an artifact. For example, a social scientists can 
be interested in the effect of cigarette use on the likelihood that another person would 
 Note that in arguing that we should not count more than one variant per person, we are not 2
arguing that we cannot count more than one competing variant per person. A ping-pong player 
may alternately use the shakehand grip and the penhold grip, and thus has adopted both variants. 
Instead, what we are arguing is that we should not count the shakehand grip more than once for 
one individual, even if the player has photos of them playing with this grip, writes in their diary 
about playing with this grip, etc.
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take up smoking, and on the possibility that each smoked cigarette increases (or 
decreases) the chance that another person will take up smoking. In cases like these it 
could be legitimate to consider measuring fitness by counting cigarettes or counting 
instances of smoking behavior. But even then, we think it should be a last resort. After all, 
there are the epistemic problems of the meme-centered approach we already sketched. 
Moreover, even in the cigarette example, what seems to matter most is how many 
individuals adopt the smoking vs. the non-smoking variant. Lastly, the number of 
cigarettes one particular individual smokes can be conceptualized as a particular cultural 
variant that is adopted by that individual. It should be noted that in biological evolution, 
the evolution of quantitative traits is dealt with in a similar organism-based way.  
4 The repeated learning problem 
Even if one is has solved the problem of individuating cultural variants, and one can treat 
cultural variants as properties of organisms in much the same way that genic variants are 
properties of organisms (capable of being phenotypic trait difference makers, for 
example), there are features of cultural dynamics unique to culture. One of these features, 
the impact of repeated learning on cultural evolution, causes deep difficulties with the 
very possibility of cultural fitness, or so argue Strimling, Enquist, and Eriksson ([2009]) 
(henceforth SEE).  In this section we analyze SEE’s arguments and ultimately conclude 
that the ‘problems’ they identify are neither unique to cultural fitness nor fatal to its 
prospects.  
4.1 The retention problem 
There are clear ways that genetic and cultural reproductive dynamics differ. Consider four 
fairly obvious, though important features of the dynamics of genes in the sexual 
reproduction of animals. First, one has precisely two genetic parents. Reproductive 
technology may soon render this false of some humans, but for now this is clearly the 
case. Second, the genetic constitution of an individual is independent of the properties of 
the history of parental mating. By this we mean that each mating is basically a genetic 
rolling of fair dice—the dice are not weighted based on how they have been previously 
thrown. Third, once an offspring is born, its genetic traits are relatively free from loss or 
transformation. This is not to deny that mutations can occur, but that mutations are rare 
and the ratio of mutated genes to non-mutated genes in an individual is approximately 
zero. Finally, parental mating post-conception has no bearing on one’s genetic 
constitution. If an individual has allele A, the later mating behavior of its parents has no 
bearing on this fact.  
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Contrast these four features with those of cultural dynamics. First, with culture, 
unlike genes, any given trait can have only one or, quite commonly, many parents 
(Enquist et al. [2010]). And the total number of parents for a given organism’s set of 
cultural traits is generally vast: We pick up cultural traits not just from shuffling the traits 
of two parents (as in the case of our genetic parents), but instead from a multitude of 
individuals in the population at large (Wimsatt [1999]). Second, because cultural mating 
can be understood as learning opportunities (genetic mating is coming together to 
potentially transfer genes in an act of copulation; cultural mating is coming together to 
potentially transfer cultural variants), while mating history is irrelevant for genes, it 
matters for culture since the number of opportunities to learn a cultural variant certainly 
bear on the probability of possessing the variant. Third, once an individual possesses a 
variant, it could be lost (forgotten) or displaced by a different variant. Fourth, the cultural 
mating that occurs after a variant is adopted affects cultural dynamics, since this can lead 
to the displacement of one variant by another. Finally, the ways that such mating can 
occur varies considerably depending on the type of culture being passed on. For example, 
some cultural variants can be passed on immediately after learning (a joke or simple fact, 
say), but some require years of maturation and/or certification before one can be a 
cultural transmitter. 
These features of cultural dynamics make it clear that there are two central 
properties of cultural variants that account for at least some of the difference between 
cultural and genetic dynamics. One is the variant’s stickiness (related to what SEE call its 
‘retention potential’), which is the probability of the variant being retained over time.  Or, 3
alternatively, one could think of it as the variant’s resistance to decay. It is clear that the 
retention potential for genes is effectively 1. Cultural traits, on the other hand, will have 
stickiness values between 1 and 0, with intermediate values being the norm. 
The other important and unique property of cultural dynamics is the 
transmissibility of the cultural trait (what SEE call its ‘diffusion potential’). This can be 
understood as the probability that a cultural trait will be adopted given exposure.  4
 There are a number of ways that the ‘stickiness’ concept could be carved up. For example, one 3
could have a more fine-grained model including variables for the probability of the variant being 
lost in the absence of competing variants, the probability of being displaced by one type, being 
displaced by another type, etc. These more complex models may well be quite useful, but for our 
purposes here, a very general notion of stickiness as retention is sufficient. 
 As with stickiness, ‘transmissibility’ is an umbrella for several related variables. There is the 4
probability of adoption by naïve individuals, the probability of being adopted by an individual 
with a competing variant of one type, another type, etc. Again, for the purposes here, these more 
complex renderings are not necessary.
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Cultural traits that are simple, attractive, or catchy, or that are associated with attractive, 
powerful, or important models are apt to have a higher than average transmissibility. For 
cultural variants, transmissibility can range from 0 (the variant has a 0 probability of 
being adopted given exposure) to 1 (the variant is guaranteed to be adopted given 
exposure). With genes, by contrast, the values are generally constant. Any given parental 
gene has a 0.5 probability of ending up in its offspring, cases of meiotic drive being the 
rare exception to this rule.  Cultural transmissibility, by contrast, has no default value, 5
and is modulated by a diverse array of transmission biases—both direct biases and 
indirect biases (Richerson and Boyd [2005]).   
The importance of the fact that cultural variants can take on a full range of 
stickiness and transmissibility values is that the expected frequency of a variant in a 
population can dramatically vary depending on the number of learning opportunities: 
Variants that are sticky but have low transmissibility might be expected to be common if 
there are many learning opportunities, but not if there are few. Similarly, variants that 
have high transmissibility and low stickiness will tend to outcompete less transmissible 
but stickier variants when there are few learning opportunities. If the variant’s fitness is 
linked to its projected frequency in the population, then fitness is critically dependent on 
the number of learning opportunities.  
What lessons can be drawn from the dependence of a cultural variant’s spread on 
its transmissibility, stickiness, and the number of learning opportunities? One lesson is 
that if the fitness of a variant is supposed to predict long-term population frequencies, 
then fitness cannot be equivalent to transmissibility. This is in opposition to some who 
equate cultural fitness with transmissibility. For example, ‘some variants are more likely 
to be imitated than others, and thus some variants have higher relative ‘cultural 
fitness’’ (Richerson and Boyd [2005] p. 79), or ‘[t]here may also be differential fitness, 
such that some cultural variants are more likely to be transmitted than others and some 
cultural models (e.g., parents, celebrities) are more likely to be copied than 
others’ (Mesoudi [2009] p. 930). These quotes show cultural fitness being tied to 
 Of course possessing a particular gene can in part be responsible for the individual surviving to 5
reproductive age, or being fertile. What is relatively invariant, however, is the conditional 
probability of the offspring receiving a particular copy of the gene given that the parent has a 
copy of it and produces an offspring.
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probabilities of imitation/transmission and are thus not taking retention into account.  If 6
fitness is supposed to predict the outcome of trait competition, then fitness solely based 
on copying will perform poorly. Likewise, SEE are correct in concluding that ‘memetics 
in its simplest form, where the success of a trait is determined by its ability to “infect” 
individuals, works only when individuals have a single learning opportunity. With several 
learning opportunities, the individual and its previous experiences and choices become 
important, so individual-based models will be more useful than meme-based 
models’ (Strimling et al. [2009], p. 13872). 
We agree with SEE that repeated learning and the complications of stickiness and 
transmissibility cause trouble for the meme-based accounts, but we see such 
complications merely as a cautionary tale for building a concept of cultural fitness, not as 
an insurmountable barrier. SEE, as we will now see, hold that these features of cultural 
fitness lead to insoluble problems. 
4.2 Is fitness transitive? 
While the complications of stickiness and transmissibility just discussed may not 
undermine the coherence of cultural fitness, SEE argue that these complications do in fact 
have a devastating impact on the prospect of cultural fitness; namely, they can lead to the 
failure of the transitivity of fitness values. They argue that for cases in which there is a 
mixed equilibrium of high transmissibility/non-sticky and low transmissibility/sticky 
types, fitness transitivity can be broken. They produce an example with three variants, 1, 
2, and 3 in which w1 = w2, w1 = w3, but that w2 < w3. Since if 1 and 2 are equally fit and 1 
and 3 are equally fit, one would infer that 2 and 3 are equally fit. But this is decidedly not 
the case. Consequently, SEE argue that ‘[i]f learning opportunities are few, […] the 
existence of a success index may be logically impossible, rendering notions of “cultural 
fitness” meaningless’ (Strimling et al. [2009], p. 13870). 
First of all, even if this claim is correct, it remains to be seen whether there are in 
fact many things that we learn socially for which there are only few learning 
opportunities. Second, and most importantly, although a breakdown of the transitivity of 
fitness values is prima facie troubling, we feel that there are difficulties with their 
example. One questionable assumption is the inference from fitness equality in one 
particular ecological setup (for example, a setup in which 1 and 2 are the only variants) to 
 One might counter that these quotes are merely taking transmissibility to be one component of 6
fitness. But in support of our interpretation, if one can infer the higher fitness of one variant from 
its higher probability of being copied, then either there are no other fitness components or the 
other components are assumed to be equivalent (which is not a realistic assumption).
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the generalization that the variants are equally fit in other ecological setups (with another 
variant, 3, for example, at play). Such inferences are not, in general, warranted (for 
cultural or for genetic variants). We will suggest that there are cases in the biological 
realm in which 1 and 2 can exist in a stable equilibrium, 1 and 3 can exist in a stable 
equilibrium, but that 3 will outcompete 2 or vice versa. Consider the following case.  
In the pacific northwest of the United States, Douglas fir, Pseudotsuga menziesii, 
is a fast growing tree that dominates many of the forests. While Douglas fir is fast 
growing and can out-compete other species in sunny patches, it is intolerant of deep 
shade and fails to grow in the dark depths of a mature forest. Other species, like western 
hemlock, Tsuga heterophylla, or Sitka spruce, Picea sitchensis, are slower growing but 
are tolerant of shade and can flourish in mature forests. Were there no disturbances, the 
fir would slowly disappear. But in forests with a moderate degree of disturbance—
occasional tree falls, landslides, fires, etc.—the fir can coexist in a stable equilibrium 
with the shade tolerant hemlock or spruce (Spies and Franklin [1989]). It is thus 
conceivable that with a moderate degree of disturbance, a forest composed of only fir and 
hemlock might find a stable equilibrium. Similarly, a forest of only fir and spruce might 
also stabilize. Using SEE’s framework, one would infer that wF = wH, wF = wS, and 
therefore wH = wS. We think that it is a bad inference to conclude that the fitness of 
hemlock and spruce are therefore equivalent. It is quite possible for a forest composed of 
hemlock and spruce only to come to fixation at 100% spruce or 100% hemlock. Nothing 
about each species’ competition with the fir says how each will fare against the other. 
Fitness values simply do not work like this. Transitivity must only hold within a single 
ecological setup of species composition and environmental conditions. 
If one is concerned that we are making relative fitness comparisons across species 
instead of among variants of a single species, consider the following example. The failure 
of transitivity paralleling the tree example above is illustrated by work on the side-
blotched lizard (Uta stansburiana). This lizard has three distinct morphs, differing in 
throat coloration and mating behavior. The mating strategy of the orange-throated males 
beats the mating strategy of the blue-throated males, but is inferior to the mating strategy 
of the yellow-throated males. The blue-throated males win when they compete with the 
yellow-throated males. This means that the fitness of the orange-throated morph is higher 
than the fitness of the blue-throated morph when these two morphs compete (w1 > w2). 
Orange-throated males have a higher fitness than yellow-throated males (w2 > w3). But it 
would be wrong to conclude from this that the blue-throated males have a higher fitness 
than yellow-throated males. Actually, the opposite is true, and there is no reason to think 
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that biological fitness is therefore hopelessly confused; it only shows that biological 
fitness measures are not transitive across ecological setups (Sinervo and Lively [1996]).  
We feel that the cases of ecological succession and lizard competition are directly 
analogous to the case that SEE find unique to cultural fitness. Furthermore, these cases 
are not particularly troubling for biological fitness and should also not be troubling in 
analogous cases of cultural evolution. Consider three distinct versions of the same joke. 
Variant 1 is very difficult to learn, but extremely funny (and therefore unlikely to be 
forgotten once learned). Variant 2 is moderately easy to learn but only moderately funny. 
Variant 3 is easy to learn but moderately funny.  If each person has on average three 
opportunities to learn the joke (which is small enough not to have the easily learned jokes 
dominate, but not so many that the extremely funny version dominates), then it is 
possible that a stable equilibrium could form with 1 and 2 or with 1 and 3. And since SEE 
use a stable equilibrium as a criterion for equality of fitness, w1 = w2 and w1 = w3. But we 
would expect the easy joke to dominate the moderately easy one, thus w2 < w3, and there 
is nothing strange about this if the competition is only between jokes 2 and 3. The 
breakdown of transitivity that SEE argue can occur thus does not arise when one is 
careful not to project fitness values beyond their local ecological setups—the transitivity 
problem is thus a phantom problem.   
5 Toward a concept of cultural fitness 
This paper has focused on defending the tenability of cultural fitness. Although this is the 
core aim of the paper, our defense can aid us in offering something positive about how 
cultural fitness can be conceived. In this section, we will draw out some of these positive 
implications for cultural fitness. 
5.1 Biological and cultural individuals 
As soon as we grant cultural variants their own independent existence, we are faced with 
myriad difficult questions about their individuation, persistence, and reproduction. As the 
case of the T-shirt exemplifies, the memeticist has to determine whether backing up a T-
shirt design by, say, emailing it to oneself counts as meme reproduction—and if it does, 
how much reproduction (it is apt to exist on the email server plus all of the email clients 
that the artist uses). Our solution has been to individuate culture not in terms of 
independently existing cultural units (or memes), but to piggyback on the individuation 
of organisms: Cultural reproduction occurs just in case an organism has adopted the 
cultural variant. This view has the advantage that biological organisms are considerably 
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easier to individuate than memes—aphids and dandelions notwithstanding (Janzen 
[1977]). 
 One implication of our arguments for an organism-centered account is that such 
an account is not merely a variant of the meme-based view. This implication is in contrast 
to some of the claims or assumptions of other authors who see the two views as 
terminological variants of one another. Henrich, Boyd, and Richerson ([2008], p. 127), 
for instance, write that ‘the appropriateness of tracking fitness from the perspective of the 
meme (assigning fitnesses to alternative memes) or to individuals (or groups) is merely a 
modeling convenience. For example, just as with genetic evolution, it is not “more 
correct” to view fitness in association with memes, individuals, or groups’ (see also 
Wimsatt [1999]). Others argue that there is a fact of the matter which description is 
correct. Brandon and Nijhout ([2006]), making a similar argument in the case of genetic 
evolution, argue that the genic and genotypic views of fitness are empirically distinct, 
predicting different dynamics, and that the genic models are empirically wrong. 
 The organism-centered view can cover much of what we would want of a CET. 
We are not, however, arguing that a single organism-based fitness concept is all we would 
need in any context. Some cultural phenomena may call for a group- or meme-level 
fitness measure. This is analogous to the multilevel fitness concepts developed by Wilson 
and others (e.g., Wilson [1977]; Boyd and Richerson [1990]). And just as a group 
selection component may play an important role in cultural evolution, there are contexts 
in which a meme-level approach would be fruitful. In biological evolution, there are 
cases of meiotic drive in which genes can bias their transmission rates, thereby rigging 
the meiotic lottery. Just as the gene’s eye view is valuable in these cases, so might the 
meme’s eye view be useful in some cases. Thus, our view allows for multilevel selection, 
but we hold that our individual organism-based view is apt to cover much of the ground 
for CETs, and because of its conceptual and epistemological advantages, it should be the 
default understanding of cultural evolution.  
5.2 Mutation and transmission biases 
Given that culture, like genes, is tied to biological organisms, we should now ask how 
best to extend the full evolutionary framework to culture. Let’s begin by considering key 
components of genetic evolution. First, there is the contribution that the gene makes to 
the organism’s fitness—this can be understood as the organism’s fitness with the gene 
minus its fitness without the gene (or with a different variant of the gene) and is 
standardly estimated in population genetics by measuring the average effect of a gene in a 
population (a linear regression of organismic fitness on number of copies of the gene). 
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Second are the chance gene frequency changes due to drift. Third is the mutational 
component. Fourth is the degree to which the gene biases its chances of making it into the 
gamete. In genetic evolution, the first can take on a wide range of values; some genes 
have a strong positive effect, while others lead to sterility or early death. The value of the 
second is highly dependent on population size. The third generally has a low value, since 
probabilities of genetic mutations are often low. The fourth is typically zero—the gene 
does not bias its probability of being selected in the meiotic lottery, though there are cases 
of meiotic drive in which a gene can cheat the lottery.  
 How do these four components of genetic evolution align with the components of 
cultural evolution? We will answer this question by first introducing the framework of 
Richerson and Boyd ([2005]) and then modifying it to align with our framework. 
Richerson and Boyd offer a tripartite division of evolutionary forces: random forces, 
decision-making forces, and natural selection. Random forces include random changes to 
cultural variants due to misremembering as well as cultural drift. The set of decision-
making forces is a large category that includes guided variation (the active invention or 
modification of cultural variants) and biased transmission. Biased transmission is, in turn, 
broken down into three categories: content-biased biases (transmission biased by features 
of the content like its usefulness or ease of being remembered), frequency-based biases 
(cultural variants being disproportionately adopted due to being in a high or low 
frequency), and model-based biases (biases due to features of the model, not the variant 
or its frequency). Finally, there is natural selection, which is restricted to ‘[c]hanges in the 
cultural composition of a population caused by the effects of holding one cultural variant 
rather than others’ (Richerson and Boyd [2005], p. 69). 
 Now let’s see how one might map Richerson and Boyd’s framework onto the 
genetic framework. Their random forces map onto the genetic mutations and drift. Their 
natural selection maps on to the fitness contribution of the genes. Now consider the 
decision-making forces. The guided variation appears to have no analogue in the genetic 
framework; there is no evidence that organisms ever synthesize genes to fulfill particular 
ends (Mesoudi [2008]). Epigenetic transformations come the closest to this, but the 
analogy is imperfect (Jablonka and Lamb [2005]). Biased transmission is also difficult to 
know how to map onto the genic framework. Content-based biases are best understood as 
analogous to meiotic drive, since the traits are biasing their probability of transmission 
(Boyd and Richerson [1985]). Model-based biases are closest to genetic hitchhiking 
(Gabora [1997]), where a gene gets passed on because of the other genes that the 
organism possesses, though in this case it could be both cultural and genic traits that 
make the model an attractive model, thereby increasing the chances of the model’s traits 
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being copied. Finally, frequency-based biases are not unlike frequency-dependent 
selection, except that Richerson and Boyd place it outside of the domain of natural 
selection. For Richerson and Boyd, therefore, natural selection is a relatively small 
player in cultural evolution. Most of the cultural changes we observe—changes in diet, 
fashion, etc., especially those that occur over short time scales—will be due to random or 
decision-making forces, not natural selection. Cultural fitness, under this view, has a 
similarly restricted domain if we preserve the tight link between natural selection and 
fitness.  
 One of the lessons from our discussion of the stickiness and transmissibility of 
cultural variants is that linking fitness only with transmissibility (the probability of being 
copied) makes fitness a poor predictor of the success of cultural variants. Thus, a 
conception of fitness that is more expansive than (at least some renderings of) memetic 
fitness is in order. But just as the memetic focus on transmissibility is too restrictive, we 
also find Richerson and Boyd’s view overly restrictive. We hold that there are many ways 
that a cultural variant can be fit. It can boost the reproductive output of the organisms in 
which it finds itself (Richerson and Boyd’s cultural natural selection), but it can also be 
highly fit by boosting transmissibility (Richerson and Boyd’s transmission biases) as well 
as stickiness. We thus call for an expansive understanding of cultural fitness, one that will 
endow it with the full suite of components helping to explain directional evolutionary 
change. Ideally, this should go together with a more expansive understanding of 
selection. If we are right, the debate between Richerson and Boyd ([2005]) and Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman ([1981]; see also Durham [1991]) on the notion of cultural selection 
is more than just a semantic argument. We think that linking fitness to selection is so 
important that it warrants the use of ‘selection’ to describe biased transmission (Houkes 
[2012]). Of course, biased transmission differs from natural selection, but that is exactly 
why Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman propose to call these forms of selection ‘cultural 
selection’.  
To summarize our positive contribution to a concept of cultural fitness: First, 
cultural fitness is measured not by counting all disembodied cultural variants, but by 
counting only one variant per biological organism. Second, cultural fitness should be able 
to explain and—to some extent—predict the outcome of cultural dynamics. Most often, 
the relevant outcome is the proportion of a population of biological individuals that have 
adopted a cultural variant after a particular time interval. In very specific cases, the 
relevant outcome can be the relative frequency of a cultural variant or of groups of 
individuals that have adopted the variant. Third, cultural fitness should track many of the 
mechanisms and processes that make cultural evolution directional in a cultural lineage. 
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Because natural selection on organisms plays a relatively weak role in increasing the 
chances of a cultural variant to spread in a biological population, cultural fitness 
differences should also be based on various biases, such as transmission biases and what 
one may call ‘retention biases’. Fourth, while an expansive concept of cultural fitness is 
desirable, one should be careful not to make it too expansive. For example, guided 
variation is, in general, best not considered to be a component of the fitness of cultural 
variants. The reason for this is that cultural fitness is used not just for understanding 
changes in the frequencies of cultural variants, but also for understanding the adaptive 
features of the cultural variants themselves. A cultural trait can be adaptive because it is 
‘intelligently designed,’ by which we mean that individual organisms produce the variant 
with the goal of producing its adaptive nature. Alternatively, it can be adaptive due to a 
process of blind variation and natural selection—the adaptive features due in part, that is, 
to their cultural fitness.  
6 Conclusions 
Cultural fitness is not as hopelessly confused as some authors have contended. If cultural 
fitness is tied to organisms (and not free-floating memes), then many of the conceptual 
problems with cultural fitness dissolve. There are still some challenges distinguishing 
growth from reproduction, but none worse than occur in biology outside of the cultural 
realm. And while repeated learning challenges the memetic view, it does not ultimately 
challenge the tenability of cultural fitness. Cultural fitness can do similar work in the 
study of cultural evolution as biological fitness does in the study of biological evolution. 
The differences between biological fitness and cultural fitness are real and substantial, but 
none of these differences diminish the tenability and usefulness of cultural fitness. In fact, 
the opposite is true: Cultural fitness is a very useful notion precisely because cultural 
fitness differs from biological fitness. 
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